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Abstract	  
Established	  psychological	  results	  have	  been	  called	  into	  question	  by	  demonstrations	  that	  statistical	  
significance	  is	  easy	  to	  achieve,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  effect.	  One	  often-­‐warned-­‐against	  practice,	  
choosing	  when	  to	  stop	  the	  experiment	  based	  on	  the	  results,	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  produce	  significant	  
results.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  demonstrations,	  Bayes	  factors	  have	  been	  proposed	  as	  an	  antidote	  to	  
this	  practice	  because	  they	  are	  invariant	  to	  how	  an	  experiment	  was	  stopped.	  Should	  researchers	  only	  
care	  about	  the	  resulting	  Bayes	  factor	  without	  concern	  for	  how	  it	  was	  produced?	  Yu,	  Sprenger,	  
Thomas,	  and	  Dougherty	  (in	  press)	  and	  Sanborn	  and	  Hills	  (in	  press)	  demonstrated	  that	  Bayes	  factors	  
are	  sometimes	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  the	  stopping	  rules	  used.	  However,	  Rouder	  (in	  press)	  provided	  
a	  compelling	  demonstration	  that	  despite	  this	  influence,	  the	  evidence	  supplied	  by	  Bayes	  factors	  
remains	  correct.	  Here	  we	  address	  why	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  Bayes	  factors	  should	  still	  matter	  to	  
researchers	  despite	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  evidence.	  We	  argue	  that	  good	  frequentist	  properties	  
mean	  that	  results	  will	  more	  often	  agree	  with	  researchers’	  statistical	  intuitions,	  and	  good	  frequentist	  
properties	  control	  the	  number	  of	  papers	  that	  will	  later	  be	  refuted.	  Both	  help	  raise	  confidence	  in	  
psychological	  results.	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Reply	  to	  Rouder	  (2014):	  Good	  Frequentist	  Properties	  Raise	  Confidence	  
The	  recent	  crisis	  of	  confidence	  in	  psychology	  has	  come	  about	  because	  papers	  that	  make	  exciting	  
claims	  with	  apparently	  solid	  evidence	  have	  been	  refuted	  by	  later	  work.	  While	  the	  probability	  of	  this	  
happening	  should	  be	  very	  low,	  researchers	  have	  shown	  that	  this	  can	  happen	  more	  often	  than	  
standard	  null	  hypothesis	  significance	  testing	  would	  suggest	  (Simmons,	  Nelson,	  &	  Simonsohn,	  2011).	  
One	  major	  concern	  is	  researchers	  engaging	  in	  optional	  stopping	  of	  experiments	  despite	  using	  
standard	  frequentist	  analyses	  that	  assume	  a	  fixed	  number	  of	  trials.	  This	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  powerful	  
misrepresentation	  of	  the	  data:	  with	  enough	  time	  and	  effort	  optional	  stopping	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  find	  a	  
significant	  result	  where	  no	  effect	  exists	  (Armitage,	  McPherson,	  &	  Rowe,	  1969).	  	  
Though	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  optional	  stopping	  should	  be	  avoided,	  researchers	  still	  engage	  in	  
this	  behavior.	  The	  prevalence	  of	  optional	  stopping	  has	  been	  highlighted	  by	  surveys	  and	  experimental	  
evidence	  (John,	  Loewenstein,	  &	  Prelec,	  2012;	  Yu,	  Sprenger,	  Thomas,	  &	  Dougherty,	  in	  press).	  In	  
particular	  Yu	  et	  al.	  (in	  press)	  experimentally	  demonstrated	  that	  professional	  researchers	  stop	  their	  
experiments	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  their	  chance	  of	  obtaining	  a	  significant	  result,	  or	  stop	  early	  if	  an	  
experiment	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  going	  well.	  The	  proportion	  of	  researchers	  in	  Yu	  et	  al.	  who	  engaged	  
in	  optional	  stopping	  was	  alarming,	  especially	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  data	  for	  that	  experiment	  was	  
collected	  after	  Simmons	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  highly	  visible	  paper	  on	  researcher	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  was	  
published.	  	  
Bayes	  factors	  have	  been	  proposed	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem,	  because	  their	  interpretation	  is	  
correct	  and	  unchanged	  for	  all	  the	  stopping	  rules	  experimenters	  appear	  to	  use	  (Berger	  &	  Wolpert,	  
1988).	  This	  invariance	  was	  acknowledged	  in	  Yu	  et	  al.	  (in	  press)	  and	  Sanborn	  and	  Hills	  (in	  press)	  and	  
demonstrated	  by	  the	  simulations	  of	  Rouder	  (in	  press).	  We	  found	  that	  Rouder’s	  demonstration	  in	  
particular	  makes	  a	  convincing	  case	  that	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Bayes	  factors	  is	  correct	  regardless	  of	  
the	  stopping	  rule.	  Thus,	  the	  assertion	  made	  in	  Yu	  et	  al.	  (in	  press)	  that	  Bayes	  factors	  are	  not	  
interpretable	  if	  data	  are	  collected	  under	  an	  optional	  stopping	  rule	  is	  clearly	  an	  overstatement,	  as	  
Rouder	  (in	  press)	  shows	  that	  the	  Bayes	  factors	  retain	  their	  interpretability	  when	  viewed	  as	  a	  
comparison	  between	  models.	  
While	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  Bayes	  factor	  is	  correct	  no	  matter	  the	  stopping	  rule	  used,	  stopping	  rules	  
can	  still	  influence	  the	  data	  collected	  and	  therefore	  the	  Bayes	  factors	  produced.	  	  Yu	  et	  al.	  (in	  press),	  
Sanborn	  and	  Hills	  (in	  press),	  and	  Rouder	  (in	  press)	  all	  showed	  in	  simulations	  that	  optional	  stopping	  
influences	  the	  resulting	  Bayes	  factors.	  For	  many	  situations	  the	  influence	  is	  small	  –	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  produce	  convincing	  Bayes	  factors	  that	  support	  the	  alternative	  when	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  
true	  (Kerridge,	  1963;	  Smith,	  1953).	  However,	  Sanborn	  and	  Hills	  (in	  press)	  showed	  that	  there	  are	  
other	  situations,	  such	  as	  when	  the	  data	  are	  generated	  by	  a	  mixture	  of	  two	  hypotheses	  or	  when	  
attempting	  to	  find	  evidence	  for	  a	  null	  effect,	  in	  which	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  find	  convincing	  evidence	  in	  
favor	  of	  either	  hypothesis,	  especially	  when	  using	  optional	  stopping.	  
The	  key	  question	  is	  then:	  Does	  being	  able	  to	  influence	  Bayes	  factors	  through	  optional	  stopping	  
matter?	  Rouder	  (in	  press)	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  problem:	  because	  the	  Bayes	  factor	  always	  provides	  a	  
correct	  interpretation	  of	  the	  evidence	  obtained,	  researchers	  do	  not	  have	  to	  worry.	  Despite	  this,	  we	  
believe	  that	  if	  researchers	  wish	  to	  use	  Bayes	  factors	  to	  raise	  the	  confidence	  in	  psychological	  results,	  
researchers	  should	  care	  about	  how	  often	  particular	  Bayes	  factors	  can	  be	  achieved	  and	  not	  just	  their	  
value.	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A	  simple	  reason	  to	  care	  about	  the	  frequentist	  properties	  of	  Bayesian	  statistics	  is	  that	  researchers,	  
inside	  psychology	  and	  out,	  are	  more	  familiar	  with	  frequentist	  statistics.	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  frequentist	  
and	  Bayesian	  evidence	  disagrees,	  then	  basing	  conclusions	  purely	  on	  Bayesian	  evidence	  will	  be	  
unconvincing.	  For	  example,	  researchers	  trained	  primarily	  on	  frequentist	  statistics	  are	  likely	  to	  
discount	  findings	  where	  the	  Bayes	  factor	  indicates	  evidence	  for	  the	  null	  hypothesis,	  yet	  the	  effect	  is	  
significant1.	  Being	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  your	  results	  also	  satisfy	  the	  common	  frequentist	  
intuitions	  of	  researchers	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  towards	  instilling	  confidence	  in	  your	  results.	  
A	  more	  complex	  reason	  is	  that	  frequentist	  properties	  are	  important	  for	  many	  common	  ways	  of	  
evaluating	  scientific	  research,	  both	  for	  publication	  and	  for	  professional	  advancement.	  Certainly	  
papers	  that	  present	  surprising	  conclusions	  supported	  by	  convincing	  evidence	  have	  the	  best	  chance	  
for	  publication.	  Producing	  papers,	  especially	  those	  that	  appear	  in	  high	  impact	  journals,	  is	  necessary	  
for	  academic	  rewards.	  Paper	  counts	  are	  important:	  having	  more	  papers	  in	  high	  impact	  journals	  is	  
better.	  The	  chances	  of	  finding	  strong	  evidence,	  which	  often	  governs	  whether	  a	  paper	  is	  publishable	  
and	  thus	  how	  many	  papers	  are	  produced,	  are	  frequentist	  properties.	  Frequentist	  properties,	  such	  as	  
how	  often	  a	  finding	  has	  been	  replicated,	  are	  also	  more	  easily	  interpreted	  by	  journalists	  and	  the	  
general	  public,	  who	  mostly	  lack	  training	  in	  statistics	  or	  probabilistic	  reasoning2.	  
Yu	  et	  al.	  (in	  press)	  showed	  that	  professional	  researchers,	  motivated	  by	  costs	  and	  rewards,	  use	  
optional	  stopping	  to	  find	  publishable	  evidence.	  It	  is	  no	  leap	  to	  suppose	  that	  if	  Bayes	  factors	  and	  
optional	  stopping	  were	  generally	  considered	  safe,	  then	  researchers	  would	  find	  the	  easiest	  ways	  to	  
produce	  evidence	  under	  the	  new	  rules.	  The	  situations	  in	  which	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  produce	  
convincing	  evidence	  in	  either	  direction	  would	  be	  particularly	  attractive.	  If	  large	  numbers	  of	  papers	  of	  
this	  type	  were	  produced,	  many	  which	  later	  are	  refuted,	  it	  would	  place	  psychological	  research	  back	  
into	  its	  current	  crisis	  of	  confidence.	  Thus	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  frequentist	  properties	  of	  Bayesian	  
tests	  to	  minimize	  the	  number	  of	  these	  papers	  seems	  like	  the	  safest	  route	  to	  raising	  confidence.	  
We	  agree	  that	  Bayes	  factors	  provide	  a	  valuable	  and	  coherent	  approach	  to	  statistical	  inference,	  and	  
we	  believe	  they	  should	  be	  more	  widely	  adopted	  and	  used,	  as	  we’ve	  detailed	  elsewhere	  (e.g.,	  
Sprenger	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Tidwell,	  Dougherty,	  Chrabaszcz,	  Thomas,	  &	  Mendoza,	  in	  press).	  If	  the	  
academic	  culture	  were	  to	  change,	  then	  one	  could	  envision	  a	  world	  in	  which	  Bayesian	  statistics	  are	  
used	  exclusively	  without	  regards	  for	  frequentist	  concerns.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  field	  has	  a	  long	  ways	  to	  
go	  before	  that	  will	  be	  the	  case,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  1	  of	  the	  314	  respondents	  in	  Yu	  et	  
al.	  reported	  using	  Bayesian	  methods.	  Thus,	  as	  it	  stands	  it	  is	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  statistical	  tests	  
have	  good	  frequentist	  properties,	  so	  that	  they	  satisfy	  the	  intuitions	  of	  consumers	  of	  our	  science,	  
whether	  they	  be	  journalists	  or	  academics.	  There	  are	  many	  different	  ways	  that	  this	  could	  be	  done,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  can	  happen	  in	  various	  situations.	  It	  can	  happen	  when	  researchers	  are	  very	  uncertain	  about	  the	  size	  of	  
the	  effect	  and	  have	  yet	  to	  collect	  sufficient	  data	  to	  overcome	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  their	  prior	  (Lindley,	  1957).	  It	  
can	  also	  happen	  after	  a	  lot	  of	  data	  have	  been	  collected:	  if	  significance	  is	  barely	  achieved,	  the	  Bayes	  factor,	  
using	  any	  reasonable	  continuous	  prior,	  will	  strongly	  favor	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  (Wagenmakers	  &	  Grünwald,	  
2006).	  
2	  One	  example	  of	  where	  frequentist	  properties	  were	  used	  for	  communicating	  findings	  recently	  appeared	  in	  a	  
book	  on	  cognitive	  training	  by	  Dan	  Hurley.	  In	  making	  the	  argue	  that	  cognitive	  training	  can	  improve	  cognitive	  
abilities,	  Hurley	  states	  “I	  am	  aware	  of	  seventy-­‐five	  randomized	  trials,	  published	  in	  peer-­‐reviewed	  scientific	  
journals,	  that	  have	  found	  a	  significant	  benefit	  to	  cognitive	  training	  of	  various	  sorts,	  and	  a	  grand	  total	  of	  four	  
that	  have	  found	  no	  such	  benefit.”	  Disregarding	  the	  question	  over	  whether	  all	  75	  articles	  really	  did	  find	  
meaningful	  improvement,	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  statement	  are	  obvious.	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some	  of	  which	  are	  outlined	  in	  Sanborn	  and	  Hills	  (in	  press).	  Therefore	  we	  echo	  Rosenbaum	  and	  
Rubin’s	  (1984)	  statement	  that	  “Bayesians	  as	  well	  as	  frequentists	  need	  to	  attend	  carefully	  to	  the	  
procedures	  used	  to	  collect	  data	  (p.	  108).”	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